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BREACHING THE GREAT FIREWALL: 
CHINA’S INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND 
THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
Christopher Stevenson* 
Abstract: In the final days of 2005, Microsoft Corporation made inter-
national headlines when it removed the site of a Beijing researcher from 
its blog hosting service. Soon, other instances of U.S. companies assist-
ing in China’s internet censorship emerged. These revelations gener-
ated outrage among commentators and legislators and led to calls for 
action. This Note examines the methods of internet censorship em-
ployed by China and other nations, and explores the assistance that U.S. 
companies have provided to these nations. It analyzes the liability issues 
facing these companies in light of existing case law and statutory solu-
tions proposed in the U.S. Congress. It then proposes a novel combina-
tion of existing legislative proposals, recommendations from the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, and international cooperation as the best 
way to address the problem of internet censorship. 
Introduction 
 During the final days of December 2005, Microsoft Corporation, 
a U.S. company, removed the site of Beijing blogger Zhao Jing from 
its MSN Spaces service.1 The move might have gone unnoticed by ma-
jor media sources but for the fact that Zhao was a research assistant in 
the Beijing bureau of the New York Times.2 Instead of fading away, 
the story broke in the U.S. media in January of 2006.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Christopher Stevenson is a Managing Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 David Barboza & Tom Zeller Jr., Microsoft Shuts Blog’s Site After Complaints in Beijing, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2006, at C3; Andrew Donoghue, Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogger, CNET 
News.com, Jan. 4, 2006, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+censors+Chinese+blogger/2100 
–1028_3–6017540.html. 
2 Barboza & Zeller, supra note 1. 
3 See Barboza & Zeller, supra note 1; Editorial, Beijing’s New Enforcer: Microsoft, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 17, 2006, at A18. 
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 Other instances of U.S. companies assisting China’s censorship 
efforts soon made headlines.4 The story of Shi Tao, a Chinese citizen 
sentenced to a ten year prison term for e-mailing a “state secret,” 
caused a great deal of outrage when it was discovered that Yahoo! had 
provided the Chinese government with information linking the e-mail 
to the IP address of Shi’s computer.5 In the midst of this turmoil, Inter-
net giant Google announced that it was starting Google.cn, a new 
search engine service hosted in China.6 This new search engine would 
not include the blogging or e-mail capabilities of Google.com and 
would comply with Chinese government restrictions that censor any 
material deemed illegal or inappropriate.7 
 Appalled by what they saw as blatant violations of human rights, 
members of the U.S. Congress convened hearings in Washington D.C. 
on February 15, 2006.8 Present were representatives from Microsoft, 
Cisco Systems, Google, and Yahoo!, as well as spokespersons from in-
ternational watchdog and human rights groups such as Reporters With-
out Borders and Radio Free Asia.9 Lawmakers lambasted the U.S. based 
Internet companies for their cooperation with the repressive Chinese 
censorship regime.10 Representative Tom Lantos (D)-CA asked the rep-
resentatives how their corporate executives could sleep at night and 
Representative Christopher Smith (R)-NJ compared the companies’ 
activities to those of businesses that worked with the Nazi regime dur-
ing World War II.11 The following day, Representative Smith introduced 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Sumner Lemon, Yahoo May Have Helped Jail Another Chinese User, NetworkWorld, 
Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/020906-yahoo-jail-user.html. 
5 Jim Kerstetter, Group Says Yahoo Helped Jail Chinese Journalist, CNET News.com, Sept. 
6, 2005, http://news.com.com/Group+says+Yahoo+helped+jail+Chinese+journalist/2100–
1028_3–5851705.html?tag=nl. The “state secret” Shi transmitted was the government’s 
reporting guidelines surrounding the 15th anniversary of Tiananmen Square protests. Id. 
6 David Barboza, Version of Google in China Won’t Offer E-mail or Blogs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 
2006, at C3. 
7 Id. 
8 Tom Zeller, Jr., Web Firms Questioned on Dealings in China, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2006, at 
C1. 
9 Ctr. for Democracy and Tech.—Censorship, http://www.cdt.org/international/cen- 
sorship/ (last visited May 5, 2007) (containing statements of these hearing participants). 
10 Declan McCullagh, Politicians Lash out at Tech Firms over China, CNET News.com, Feb. 
16, 2006, http://news.com.com/Politicians+lash+out+at+tech+firms+over+China/2100–
1028_3–6039834.html; Zeller, Jr., supra note 8. 
11 The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint Hearing Before the House 
Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong. 5–7 (2006) (statement of Rep. Smith, 
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Op-
erations), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/26075.pdf; Zeller, 
Jr. supra note 8. 
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the “Global Online Freedom Act of 2006” that will, if passed, proscribe 
most of the censorship being conducted by companies such as 
Google.12 
 These hearings, and the outrage expressed by legislators, report-
ers, and Internet experts are only the latest salvos in the battle for 
online freedom of expression.13 Legislators, scholars, and the Internet 
community have struggled for years to find a solution to the problem of 
governmental Internet restrictions in China and other countries and 
the apparent aid that U.S. companies have provided in the enforce-
ment of those restrictions.14 If the Internet is to remain a safe forum for 
the free and open exchange of ideas, lawmakers and the Internet 
community must work together to prevent repressive censorship. 
 Part I of this Note begins by exploring the history of Internet cen-
sorship laws. It then focuses on China’s laws and its intricate system of 
information restriction known as “The Great Firewall of China.” Finally, 
it examines the role U.S. companies have played in supporting these 
censorship regimes. Part II addresses the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the liability of U.S. companies that violate the laws of foreign countries 
and discusses two pieces of legislation, the Global Information Free-
dom Act and the new Global Online Freedom Act, which Congress has 
proposed as possible solutions to the problem. Part III examines the 
shortcomings of the Global Online Freedom Act and discusses how a 
combination of aspects of the Global Information Freedom Act, sug-
gestions from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and increased global 
cooperation is the best way to address this problem. 
I. Background 
 For much of the 1990s, the Internet was seen as a great advance 
in promoting freedom of expression throughout the world.15 It was 
assumed that the free flow of information would lead to freer socie-
                                                                                                                      
12 Tom Zeller Jr., Internet Firms Facing Questions About Censoring Online Searches in China, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2006, at C3. 
13 See H.R. 4741, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2216, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 48, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (attempting to enact the Global Internet Freedom Act in previous years). 
14 See Jim Hu, Rights Group Looks at China and Techs, CNET News.com, Nov. 27, 2002, 
http://news.com.com/Rights+group+looks+at+China+and+techs/2100–1023_3–975517. html; 
Rebecca MacKinnon, China’s Internet: Let a Thousand Filters Bloom, YaleGlobal Online, June 28, 
2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5928. 
15 Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders: National Boundaries Have Survived in 
the Virtual World—and Allowed National Laws to Exert Control over the Internet, Legal Aff. Jan.-
Feb. 2006, at 40; David Lee, Multinationals Making a Mint from China’s Great Firewall, S. 
China Morning Post, Oct. 2, 2002, at 16, available at 2002 WLNR 4489164. 
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ties.16 Unfortunately, the Internet has not been a liberating force as 
expected.17 Governments that wish to restrict their citizens’ access to 
certain information have proven remarkably adept at being able to do 
so—often with the help of U.S. companies.18 To understand fully 
China’s rationale for restricting information and the elaborate ends 
to which it and other countries will go to enforce their restrictions, it 
is useful to begin with a look at the laws and methods they employ. 
A. A Brief History of Internet Censorship 
 China is by no means the only country censoring Internet con-
tent.19 Many forms of restriction exist in many countries.20 
1. Censorship by Laws 
 Some countries have employed their restrictions simply through 
laws preventing the display of materials deemed inappropriate. One of 
the earliest attempts at instituting this kind of censorship regime came, 
interestingly enough, from the United States.21 In addition to prohibit-
ing the transmission of obscene material and child pornography, the 
“Communications Decency Act of 1996” (CDA) attempted to criminal-
ize the communication of “indecent” and “patently offensive” content 
to any person under 18 years of age.22 The “patently offensive” and “in-
decent” material restrictions were immediately challenged and eventu-
ally struck down by the United States Supreme Court as overly vague 
and broad restrictions on freedom of speech.23 
 Congress tried again in 1998 by enacting the “Child Online Pro-
tection Act” (COPA).24 This law had the same effect but was more nar-
rowly tailored than the CDA and was not found to be unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                      
16 Lee, supra note 15. 
17 See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 15, at 41; Lee supra note 15. 
18 See Shanthi Kalathil & Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The 
Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule 107–15 (2003); Elaine M. Chen, Global 
Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom Coexist?, 13 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 229, 
246–48 (2003); MacKinnon, supra note 14. 
19 See, e.g., Kalathil & Taylor, supra note 18, at 107–15 (detailing restrictions in 
China, Cuba, Singapore, Vietnam, Burma, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt). 
20 See id. 
21 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 521 U.S. 844, 859–61 (1997) (evaluat-
ing 47 U.S.C. § 223). 
22 47 U.S.C. § 223. 
23 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849. 
24 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
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on its face.25 Applying strict scrutiny, however, the Court ruled that 
the government still had the burden of proving that the restrictions in 
COPA were no more restrictive than necessary to advance the stated 
goal of protecting children from harm.26 The government is still col-
lecting data in an attempt to show that personal web filters—the 
Court’s suggested alternative to COPA—are not as effective as COPA‘s 
provisions.27 
 A similar law has met with far more success in Australia.28 The 
“Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act” was passed 
in 1999 and regulates Internet content based on classifications made by 
a Classification Review Board: R18 (information deemed likely to be 
disturbing or harmful to persons under 18 years of age), X18 (nonvio-
lent sexually explicit material involving consenting adults), and RC (re-
fused classification).29 Material in the X18 and RC categories is prohib-
ited content regardless of whether or not it is only available to adults.30 
Material classified as R18 is allowed, but only on sites that restrict mi-
nors’ access via a government approved adult verification system.31 
 Instead of searching for prohibited content, the government relies 
on public complaints to the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) to identify prohibited or potentially prohibited con-
tent.32 When prohibited or potentially prohibited material is discovered 
on Australian servers, the ACMA issues take-down notices to Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Hosts.33 When the pro-
hibited content is hosted outside the country, the ACMA simply notifies 
approved makers of filtering and blocking software to add the content 
to their blacklists.34 
                                                                                                                      
25 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002). 
26 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 
27 Arshad Mohammed, Google Refuses Demand for Search Information, Wash. Post, Jan. 
20, 2006, at A1. 
28 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act, 1999, sched. 5, pt. 1 
(Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet/99077.pdf [hereinafter Aus-
tralian BSA]. 
29 Id. 
30 Electronic Frontiers Australia, Internet Censorship Laws in Australia, 
http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Censorship Laws in Australia]. 
31 Id. 
32 Australian BSA, supra note 28, at sched. 5 pt. 4. The ACMA does, however, have the 
authority to initiate investigations on its own. Id. 
33 Censorship Laws in Australia, supra note 30. 
34 Id. 
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2. Censorship by Active Filtering 
 In contrast to the reactive systems used in Australia and proposed 
in the United States, the Internet censorship systems employed by 
many other countries rely on much more proactive filtering of Internet 
content.35 Saudi Arabia is a good example of such a country.36 In fact, it 
did not even allow public access to the Internet until it had established 
sufficient filtering technology in 1999.37 The country is unusually open 
about its filtering mechanisms and policies.38 The Internet Services 
Unit (ISU), which controls Internet access, maintains information 
about the filtering policy and mechanisms on its website.39 The current 
prohibited content is described by a 2001 resolution of the Council of 
Ministers.40 The ISU also maintains records of which users are online 
and which sites they access.41 
 In practice, the Saudi system seems focused on particular areas of 
government and religious concern.42 Testing by the OpenNet Initiative 
revealed extensive Saudi filtering of sites dealing with pornography, 
drugs, gambling, and religious conversion.43 Sites containing tools to 
circumvent filtering technologies are also blocked.44 In contrast, sites 
dealing with homosexuality, religion, and even alcohol are relatively 
accessible.45 
 Other countries have introduced their own filtering systems.46 
Iran and Burma are notable for their extremely strict systems.47 China 
                                                                                                                      
35 Electronic Frontiers Australia, Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around 
the World, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2002). 
36 OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004, http://www. 
opennetinitiative.net/studies/saudi/ [hereinafter Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia]. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Internet Services Unit, Local Content Services Policy, http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-
internet/contenet-filtring/filtring-policy.htm (last visited May 5, 2007); Internet Services 
Unit, Local Content Filtering Procedure, http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-
filtring/filtring-mechanism.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). 
40 Council of Ministers Resolution, Feb. 12, 2001, available at http://www.al-bab.com/ 
media/docs/saudi.htm (banning access to any sites contrary to the state or its system, sites 
containing damaging news about the Kingdom or heads of state, sites containing subver-
sive ideas, or sites infringing the sanctity of Islam or breaching public decency). 
41 Id. 
42 Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia, supra note 36. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Censorship Laws in Australia, supra note 30. 
47 See OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Burma in 2005, Oct. 2005, avail-
able at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/burma/ONI_Burma_Country_Study.pdf; Open-
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is clearly not the only offender in the Internet world, but it is the most 
sophisticated and effective.48 
B. China’s Great Firewall 
 The term “Great Firewall of China” is somewhat of a misnomer. 
Rather than using a single web filtering mechanism, China employees 
a complex system of laws, technology, and human oversight that effec-
tively controls the web content available to users within China.49 In 
the 1990s, few people would have believed this kind of control possi-
ble.50 Many scholars believed that the world-wide expansion of the 
Internet would lead to the demise of repressive regimes as people 
around the world gained access to new ideas and information.51 
China was also worried about the impact of the Internet and struc-
tured its system accordingly.52 
1. Legal Restrictions 
 Chinese Internet regulations on providers of Internet services are 
promulgated and enforced by a number of overlapping agencies.53 The 
first major law to regulate Internet content was the 1996 “Interim Pro-
visions Governing Management of Computer Information Networks in 
the People’s Republic of China Connecting to the International Net-
work.”54 The provisions were amended and enhanced in 1998 and 2000 
by the “Provisions for the Implementation of the Interim Provisions 
Governing Management of Computer Information Networks in the 
People’s Republic of China,” State Council Order No. 292, “Measures 
on Internet Information Services” (IIS Measures), and the “Decision of 
                                                                                                                      
Net Initiative, Internet Filtering in Iran in 2004–2005, available at http://www.open 
netinitiative.net/studies/iran/ONI_Country_Study_Iran.pdf [hereinafter Internet Fil-
tering in Iran]. 
48 See OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China in 2004–2005, Apr. 14, 
2005, available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONI_China_Country_ 
Study.pdf [hereinafter Internet Filtering in China]; Derek Bambauer, Cool Tools for 
Tyrants; The Latest American Technology Helps the Chinese Government and Other Repressive Re-
gimes Clamp Down, Legal Aff., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 56. 
49 Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 3. 
50 See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 15, at 40; Lee, supra note 15. 
51 See Kalathil & Boas, supra note 18, at 1–2, 14; Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 15, at 
40; Lee, supra note 15. 
52 See Hu, supra note 14. 
53 See Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 8, app. 2. 
54 See Jill R. Newbold, Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling 
China Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. Ill. J. L. Tech & Pol’y 503, 507–08. 
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the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Preserv-
ing Computer Network Security.”55 Taken as a whole, these regulations 
prevent Internet users and ISPs from displaying any content not ap-
proved by the government.56 This includes content that divulges state 
secrets, subverts the government, opposes the State’s policy on religion, 
advocates cults or feudal superstitions, disrupts the social order, or 
shows obscenity, pornography, gambling, or violence.57 
 All Internet information services must be licensed (if commercial) 
or registered with the authorities (if private).58 If they provide news, 
publishing, bulletin board, or “other services,” site operators must re-
cord the IP address and domain name information of all content pro-
vided.59 ISPs must record and retain for sixty days the amount of time 
users spend online, their account numbers, their IP addresses, and 
their dial-up numbers.60 If the site operator or ISP discovers prohibited 
information, it must be removed immediately, and records of the event 
must be retained and communicated to the appropriate authorities.61 
 The latest addition to this string of regulations came in 2005 and 
deals specifically with providers of “Internet news information ser-
vices.”62 The term “Internet news” is defined broadly as “information 
on current and political affairs, which includes reports and comments 
on social public affairs such as those relating to politics, economy, 
military and diplomatic affairs and sudden events of society”63 The 
regulation applies to anyone who publishes news information on web-
sites, provides bulletin board system services on current and political 
topics, or transmits information on current and political topics to the 
public.64 The new law contains all of the content restrictions and in-
formation retention of earlier laws, but adds the requirement that any 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Preserv-
ing Computer Network Security, Ninth People’s Congress, Dec. 28, 2000, at http://eng- 
lish.gov.cn/laws/2005–09/22/content_68771.htm [hereinafter Decisions]; Measures on 
Internet Information Services, State Council Order No. 292, Sept. 25, 2000, translation avail-
able at http://www.transasialawyers.com/translation/legis_16_e.pdf [hereinafter IIS Meas-
ures]; Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 9. 
56 Decisions, supra note 55, art. 2–4; IIS Measures, supra note 55, art. 15. 
57 Decisions, supra note 55, art. 2–4; IIS Measures, supra note 55, art. 15. 
58 IIS Measures, supra note 55, art. 7. 
59 Id. art. 14. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Song Huang & Lingli Cheng, Digital Divide New Rules on Internet News Information, 
China L. & Prac., Dec. 2005, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/default.asp?Page=1&c 
Index=2&SID=4869&M=12&Y=2005. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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news about current and political affairs must be the information re-
leased by official government news agencies.65 Moreover, it is widely 
believed that the law is written broadly enough to encompass bloggers 
who post non-approved information.66 
 Providers of electronic messaging and bulletin board services must 
abide by their own set of restrictive rules.67 Under the “Administration 
of Internet Electronic Messaging Provisions,” all must obtain govern-
ment approval before offering those services and must post their per-
mit number, their messaging rules, and warnings about the liability 
they and users bear for the posting of restricted information.68 Censors 
must be employed to ensure that the content of bulletin boards and 
chat room messages comply with government restrictions.69 
 These electronic messaging restrictions were recently augmented 
by new regulations designed to prevent spam.70 The new provisions re-
quire users to enter true information about their identities when sub-
scribing for e-mail addresses and mandate that the e-mail provider re-
tain all sign-on and access records for sixty days.71 
 Operators of cybercafés are also singled out for special treatment 
under Chinese law.72 Following a deadly cybercafé fire in 2002, the gov-
ernment imposed strict safety and licensing requirements for café own-
ers.73 Included in the new regulations were provisions prohibiting op-
erators and users from using the cafés to access any of the categories of 
materials deemed inappropriate by the laws detailed above.74 Technical 
measures must be installed to detect users who access illegal informa-
tion and those users must be reported to the authorities.75 The creden-
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services Provisions, State Coun-
cil, Oct. 27, 2000, translation available at http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/default.asp? 
Page=1&cIndex=2&SID=707&M=1&Y=2001. 
68 Id. arts. 8, 10. 
69 Kalathil & Boas, supra note 18, at 26. 
70 See Internet Society of China, China to Regulate Internet Email Services, 
Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca346007.htm; Sumner Lemon, China’s MII 
Publishes New E-mail Regulations, NetworkWorld, Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.networkworld. 
com/news/2006/030806-china-e-mail-regulations.html. 
71 Internet Society of China, supra note 70; Lemon, supra note 70. 
72 See Newbold, supra note 54, at 510; Regulations on Administration of Business Prem-
ises for Internet Access Services, State Council, Sept. 29, 2002, available at http://english. 
gov.cn/laws/2005–07/25/content_16964.htm [hereinafter Cybercafé Rules]. 
73 See Newbold, supra note 54, at 510. 
74 Cybercafé Rules, supra note 72, art. 14. 
75 Id. art. 19. 
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tials of all users must be checked and registered, along with that user’s 
log-on information.76 These records must be kept for 60 days.77 
 Finally, the Chinese government has created a voluntary “Public 
Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet 
Industry” as well as a system by which citizens can report sites contain-
ing illegal information.78 The Pledge requires the Internet company 
to monitor the information published by users, refrain from produc-
ing any prohibited information, remove harmful information, and 
refrain from establishing links to websites that contain harmful in-
formation.79 The reporting system consists of a website through which 
Internet users can inform government censors of any illegal content 
they discover online.80 
2. Technical Barriers 
 China backs up its extensive system of regulations with extensive 
technical control of its network.81 Development of the Chinese Inter-
net system has been controlled by the government from its incep-
tion.82 In 1996, early in the network’s development, the government 
group in charge of development decided to create a two-tiered system 
of Internet access. One tier is available for the public.83 ISPs connect 
to this tier and provide access services to their customers.84 This first 
tier, however, is only able to access the greater Internet outside the 
country through a second tier of the network.85 This second tier is 
completely controlled by the State and thus provides government 
control over the borders between the Chinese Internet and the rest of 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. art. 23. 
77 Id. 
78 See Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet In-
dustry, Internet Society of China, July 19, 2002, available at http://www.isc.org.cn/ 
20020417/ca102762.htm [hereinafter Pledge]; Cyberspace Regulator Meets the Press, China 
Internet Information Center, Feb. 17, 2006, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/ 
Show_Text?info_id=158424&p_qry=Liu%20and%20Zhengrong (discussing the “China Re- 
porting Center of Illegal and Unhealthy Information”). 
79 Pledge, supra note 78, art. 9. 
80 See Cyberspace Regulator Meets the Press, supra note 78. 
81 See Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 3. 
82 See Kalathil and Boas, supra note 18, at 21. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. 
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the world.86 This plan has effectively made the entire country’s net-
work into one big intranet.87 
 The Chinese network backbone is comprised of some of the most 
powerful and advanced network technology available in the world. The 
OpenNet Initiative’s 2004–05 study of Chinese Internet filtering re-
ported that the Cisco 12000 series routers used in the network’s back-
bone have dynamic packet filtering capabilities that allow the applica-
tion of up to 750,000 bi-directional packet filtering rules.88 It also 
appears that the government is using firewall and other network secu-
rity software to selectively block data.89 
 With all of this technology at work, China’s ability to censor in-
formation is extensive.90 OpenNet Initiative’s testing revealed that 
websites with information about Falun Gong, Tibetan Independence, 
and Taiwan were consistently inaccessible from within the country.91 It 
found evidence of the interception of e-mail containing sensitive data, 
although this technology seemed less mature—filtering success largely 
depended on the language and character encoding used in the mes-
sages.92 Messages submitted to online chat rooms were frequently ex-
cluded or removed if they contained sensitive information, and web 
sites that contained sensitive topics were excluded from the search 
results on China’s largest search engines.93 Clearly the country has 
enormous censorship ability and does not hesitate to use it.94 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. 
87 Newbold, supra note 54, at 511. An intranet is an Internet-like network that is sepa-
rated from the rest of the Internet. Most organizations with computer networks employ an 
intranet design to facilitate intra-organization information sharing and to protect their 
computers from users on the rest of the Internet. See Webopedia, Intranet, http://www.| 
webopedia.com/TERM/i/intranet.html (last visited May 6, 2007). 
88 Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 7. Dynamic packet filtering tech-
nology enables an Internet router or firewall to examine individual TCP/IP data packets as 
they pass through the device and exclude those that the router administrator has identi-
fied in the router’s “rules.” These rules can restrict entire Internet protocols or packets 
coming from or going to specified Internet domains, IP addresses, or URLs containing 
certain words or phrases. See Webopedia, Stateful Inspection, http://www.webopedia.com/ 
TERM/S/stateful_inspection.html (last visited May 7, 2007). 
89 See Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 23–27. 
90 See id. at 23. 
91 See id. at 23–27. 
92 See id. at 46–47. 
93 See id. at 49, 51. 
94 See Internet Filtering in China, supra note 48, at 52. 
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C. Foreign Assistance 
 Although China certainly has capable engineers within its own 
country, experts agree that it could not have developed its system of 
monitoring and filtering without the help of Western hardware and 
software companies.95 In fact, many countries that filter Internet con-
tent have taken advantage of products from U.S. companies.96 Testing 
by the OpenNet Initiative has shown that SmartFilter software made 
by the U.S. company Secure Computing is used by government filters 
in Tunisia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.97 
 As noted above, routers and switches manufactured by Silicon 
Valley based Cisco Systems (Cisco) comprise a large part of the Chi-
nese Internet backbone and Internet filtering technology.98 By one 
estimate, the company earns $500 million per year in China.99 Cali-
fornia computer giant Sun Microsystems and web-monitoring software 
maker Websense have also been implicated in sales of web filtering 
and monitoring technology to China.100 
 In the past few years, Internet companies have entered the Chi-
nese playing field and have recently made headlines for the assistance 
they have provided to the censorship program.101 Well before the en-
actment of the “Rules on the Administration of Internet News Informa-
tion Services,” U.S. companies providing e-mail, SMS, or Internet portal 
services such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google, were already participat-
ing in the censorship of information.102 
 In mid-2002, Yahoo! signed China’s “Public Pledge on Self-
discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry” and voluntarily agreed 
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to refrain from establishing links to prohibited websites or disseminat-
ing “harmful information.”103 Since that time, Yahoo!’s search engine 
has returned restricted search results to Chinese users without in-
forming them of any limitations.104 
 In 2005, soon after the enactment of the “Rules on the Admini-
stration of Internet News Information Services,” Yahoo! provided the 
Chinese government with information that linked the IP address of 
Shi Tao’s computer to an e-mail the Chinese government found ob-
jectionable.105 The “state secret” leaked in the e-mail was information 
about government reporting guidelines for the commemoration of 
the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.106 Shi 
was sentenced to a ten year prison term for releasing it.107 
 Google initially resisted the Chinese censorship system and China 
blocked access to the site in early 2002.108 Although it continued to 
resist censorship, Google was eventually unblocked.109 In 2004, how-
ever, Google began to provide a version of Google news to China that 
excluded links to publications the Chinese government found objec-
tionable.110 
 On January 24, 2006, Google announced its own limited Internet 
search engine, Google.cn, that would be hosted in China.111 The site’s 
search results only display links to sites to which the Chinese govern-
ment does not object.112 Although the search engine informs users 
that the search results have been censored, its technology actually ex-
cludes more information than the Yahoo! site and local Chinese 
search engines.113 To avoid collecting user-identifying information, 
the site lacks the e-mail and blogging capabilities of Google.com and 
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also lacks the caching functionality that would allow Chinese users 
access to unblocked cached versions of prohibited websites.114 
 Microsoft has also helped censor Internet information.115 When 
its online blog service, MSN Spaces, became available in China in May 
2005 through servers in Shanghai, users discovered that the use of the 
words democracy, freedom, human rights, or demonstration in their 
postings returned an error message indicating that their “item con-
tained forbidden speech.”116 
 In December 2005, Microsoft removed the blog of Zhao Jing 
from MSN Spaces at the request of the Chinese government.117 Zhao, 
also known as Michael Anti on his blog, was well known to the Chi-
nese government.118 He had frequently posted political commentaries 
by Chinese writers and had already been blocked for posting a letter 
critical of the editor of the China Youth Daily in a blog.119 Microsoft 
not only removed Zhao’s blog, but likely did so from a server within 
the United States.120 That a U.S. company would comply with censor-
ship demands and remove content from U.S.-hosted servers finally 
angered Congress into taking action.121 
II. Discussion 
 Over the past several years, developments in law have left open 
the question of whether U.S. Internet companies can be held liable 
for violations of foreign Internet censorship laws.122 At the same time, 
there have been legislative attempts to define the U.S. government’s 
role in this area and limit the assistance U.S. companies can provide 
to Internet censoring countries.123 
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A. Internet Jurisdiction 
 U.S. companies argue that they must comply with foreign gov-
ernments’ demands if they want to conduct business in foreign coun-
tries.124 Their compliance, however, may stem more from a desire to 
avoid liability for violation of foreign laws.125 Such a fear is not un-
founded after two French groups brought a lawsuit against Internet 
giant Yahoo!.126 
 In April 2000, La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (LICRA) 
sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo!’s Santa Clara, California head-
quarters which threatened legal action unless the Internet company 
stopped providing access to sites selling Nazi paraphernalia.127 Five days 
later, LICRA commenced such a lawsuit against Yahoo! and Yahoo! 
France in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris.128 The suit was 
joined by L’Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF).129 
 The suit claimed that Yahoo! had violated section R645–2 of the 
French Penal Code, which bans the exhibition of Nazi paraphernalia 
for sale and prohibits French citizens from purchasing or possessing 
such material.130 Although Yahoo! operated a subsidiary in France, 
fr.yahoo.com, which removed such content, other Yahoo! servers 
hosted auction sites on which these materials were offered for sale.131 
These sites were accessible to anyone, including users in France, who 
entered Yahoo! through its main portal www.yahoo.com.132 
 The French court issued an interim order on May 22, which re-
quired Yahoo! to “take all necessary measures to dissuade and render 
impossible any access via yahoo.com to the auction service for Nazi 
merchandize as well as to any other site or service that may be con-
strued as an apology for Nazism or contesting the reality of Nazi 
crimes,” and imposed monetary penalties for each day of delay or 
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confirmed violation.133 Yahoo! objected to this order, contending that 
there was no technical solution that would allow it to fully comply.134 
 After commissioning an expert study of the situation, the court 
found that it was possible to determine a web surfer’s country of origin 
with about seventy percent certainty.135 Making particular reference to 
the fact that it appeared that Yahoo! was already using some of this 
technology, the court upheld its earlier interim order on November 6, 
2000.136 This new interim order kept the monetary penalties of the May 
order intact and added a provision requiring fr.yahoo.com to display a 
warning to surfers before they were able to link to www.yahoo.com.137 
The decision, however, declared that Yahoo! France, through actions 
taken after the initial order, had already “complied in large measure 
with the spirit and letter” of the May 22 order.138 
 The court did not impose the penalties of the order and LICRA 
and UEJS did not attempt to convince the court to do so.139 Instead, 
the two groups claimed that they would only seek to have the penal-
ties imposed if Yahoo! “revert[ed] to their old ways and violat[ed] 
French law.”140 At the time of this writing, neither plaintiff has sought 
enforcement of the penalties. 
 In late 2000, Yahoo! filed suit in federal district court in Califor-
nia.141 The suit sought a declaratory judgment that the interim orders 
were not enforceable in the United States.142 That court determined it 
had personal jurisdiction over the French groups and later deter-
mined enforcement of the orders was not mandatory and that a U.S. 
court does not have to give effect to foreign judicial orders if those 
orders violate American public policy or fundamental interests.143 The 
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French orders were found to violate Yahoo!’s fundamental rights un-
der the First Amendment and were declared unenforceable.144 
 LICRA and UEJF appealed to the Ninth Circuit and a three justice 
panel found that the district court erred in finding personal jurisdic-
tion over the two organizations.145 The court granted rehearing en 
banc and reversed the panel’s holding of lack of jurisdiction.146 The 
case was dismissed, however, because, of the eleven judges, a three 
judge plurality did not find Yahoo!’s First Amendment claim ripe for 
adjudication and another three judges found no personal jurisdic-
tion.147 
 In short, the French injunction against Yahoo! remains in effect 
and the question remains unanswered whether it or any other order 
forcing a U.S. company to comply with foreign Internet censorship laws 
is a violation of the First Amendment.148 It appears that an actual at-
tempt by a foreign government to impose damages would not be en-
forced, but injunctions that restrict the kinds of information foreign 
web surfers can access from those countries may be enforceable.149 
Google, Microsoft, and the other companies doing business in China 
may be forced, by threat of injunction, to comply with Chinese court 
orders limiting the kind of content available to Chinese surfers.150 
B. Global Internet Freedom Act 
 The “Global Internet Freedom Act” (GIFA) was first introduced in 
the House and Senate in October 2002.151 Nearly identical versions of 
the bill were introduced in 2003, 2005, and 2006, but not one has been 
enacted.152 The purpose of the Act, as stated in its most recent itera-
tion, is “to develop and deploy technologies to defeat ‘Internet jam-
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ming.’”153 If passed, it would establish the Office of Global Internet 
Freedom (OGIF) within the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), 
which would work to develop and implement a comprehensive global 
strategy to combat the state-sponsored and state-directed “Internet-
jamming” and user persecution conducted by repressive foreign gov-
ernments.154 
 The idea behind the Act stems from the historical activities of the 
U.S. Foreign Information Service (FIS).155 The FIS, now the IBB, was 
created in 1941 and began broadcasting the Voice of America (VOA) 
during World War II.156 For much of its existence, a large portion of 
VOA’s operating funds have been spent on technologies to prevent 
repressive governments from jamming the transmission of news from 
VOA, Radio Free Asia, and other news sources.157 
 The IBB already deploys some technology to counter Internet-
jamming, but the Act would significantly increase the volume of this 
activity.158 At the date of the latest introduction of the Act, the VOA 
and Radio Free Asia had spent only $3 million on Internet counter-
jamming technology.159 The Act would establish a budget of $50 mil-
lion for the OGIF.160 The OGIF would be specifically authorized to 
work with the private sector to acquire and implement the technology 
necessary to defeat Internet blocking and censorship.161 
C. Global Online Freedom Act 
 The latest legislative response to Internet censorship is the 
“Global Online Freedom Act of 2006” (GOFA).162 This bill was intro-
duced in February 2006 at the close of the House Subcommittee 
hearings on Chinese Internet censorship.163 It incorporates elements 
of GIFA, but extends that bill to include stiff civil and criminal penal-
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ties for U.S. companies that offer assistance to governments that cen-
sor, block, monitor, or restrict access to the Internet.164 
 Like GIFA, GOFA would create an Office of Global Internet Free-
dom to develop and implement a global strategy to counter Internet 
blocking and censoring by foreign governments.165 Unlike GIFA, the 
GOFA OGIF would be part of the Department of State and would ul-
timately report to the President.166 It would develop a strategy to com-
bat Internet censorship, but would also work with the President to 
create an annual report of countries that restrict Internet access and 
the methods by which that restriction is achieved.167 
 With information supplied by the OGIF, the President would de-
termine which countries were directly or indirectly responsible for 
restricting Internet freedom and would provide an annual list of des-
ignated “Internet-restricting” countries to Congress.168 The GOFA 
would initially designate Burma, China, Iran, North Korea, Tunisia, 
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam to this list.169 
 U.S. companies could not host a search engine in a country des-
ignated Internet-restricting.170 They could not alter the search results 
of their U.S.-hosted search engines to satisfy the laws of foreign coun-
tries, and they would have to provide the OGIF with any and all terms 
and parameters that any foreign country uses to filter its results.171 
Content hosts could restrict access to content at the request of foreign 
Internet-restricting governments, but would be required to provide a 
list of any content removed or blocked to the OGIF.172 Finally, no U.S. 
business could provide any official from an Internet-restricting coun-
try with information that could personally identify a particular user of 
that company’s services.173 
 The GOFA would create a private right of action in U.S. courts 
for citizens of Internet-restricting countries whose personal informa-
tion is revealed to their governments.174 These civil suits could result 
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in damage awards of up to $2 million.175 Additional criminal penalties 
would result in fines against companies and up to five years impris-
onment for individuals convicted of information disclosure.176 
 The Attorney General could bring civil suits for violation of the 
search engine and content host provisions of the Act, which could 
result in penalties of up to $10,000.177 Individuals violating these pro-
visions would face criminal fines and up to one year in prison.178 
 Finally, the GOFA would establish controls on exports and licens-
ing of hardware and software.179 The Act would require the promulga-
tion of regulations preventing the knowing export of items used in 
Internet censorship to “Internet-restricting” countries.180 
III. Analysis 
 While at first glance the GOFA appears to address the issue of 
Internet censorship head-on and punish those companies that assist 
Internet-restricting governments,181 upon closer inspection several 
troubling details arise. A thoughtful analysis reveals that the bill, if en-
acted as is, would go too far in its policing efforts while at the same time 
do too little to curb international Internet censorship. 
A. Excessive Provisions 
 The first troubling aspect of GOFA lies in its definition of a 
“United States Business.”182 The bill includes companies that are incor-
porated in the United States, subsidiaries of those companies, and “any 
issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.”183 This means that any company listed on one 
of the U.S. security exchanges could be found liable in a U.S. court.184 
Tom Online, Sohu.com, and Baidu.com, the leading Chinese search 
engine, are all Chinese companies listed on the NASDAQ exchange 
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and could face U.S. lawsuits if the GOFA is enacted.185 Whether any 
damages in such suits could be enforced is questionable after Yahoo! v. 
LICRA, but the uncertainty would be damaging to those companies and 
their U.S. financial backers.186 Faced with the choice of breaking either 
local laws or U.S. laws, these companies would simply de-list themselves 
from NASDAQ and join either the Shanghai exchange or the Hong 
Kong Bourse.187 This would do nothing to curb censorship and would 
hurt the NASDAQ and its U.S. investors.188 
 Another cause for concern is the section of the Act that forces U.S. 
companies to report any content they have been asked to block or re-
move from their servers.189 While a case can be made that the U.S. gov-
ernment needs to know what kind of content is censored in order to 
create effective countermeasures to Internet restrictions, this provision 
goes too far.190 By obtaining the content of blogs, e-mail, and websites 
blocked by foreign countries, OGIF would obtain exactly the kind of 
personal information about Internet users that it would work to pre-
vent other countries from learning.191 This result could lead to distrust 
of the OGIF and the U.S. government.192 
 A third area in which the GOFA causes concern is its list of Inter-
net-restricting countries.193 The OGIF would compile data about 
countries’ Internet censorship activities and consult with private com-
panies and non-government organizations for assistance, but it would 
be the President, with no discernable guidelines to follow, who would 
decide which countries were on the list.194 The implications of this 
system are troubling. 
 First, businesses selling products to foreign countries would be 
hurt financially.195 Not only would they be prevented from selling any 
products that have the potential to aid in censorship to Internet-
restricting countries, but they might also be unable to enter into multi-
year contracts to supply these products or support services to any coun-
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try.196 With the possibility of arbitrary inclusion of any country to the 
list, a company could find itself breaking the law by fulfilling its con-
tract obligations in a country that was not on the list at the time of the 
agreement, but was included later. 
 Second, the list has the potential to be politically motivated. The 
interests of goodwill or positive foreign relations could easily trump 
the goal of reducing Internet censorship abroad. Indeed the makeup 
of the initial list of Internet-restricting countries already reveals this 
sort of political favoritism.197 The initial countries include communist 
regimes and countries hostile to the United States, while other coun-
tries that have strict Internet censorship laws, but are financially im-
portant to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, are conspicuously absent.198 
B. Ineffective Measures 
 While the GOFA is excessive in many of its provisions,199 it still 
manages to be relatively ineffective at preventing Internet blocking and 
censorship. If the goal of the Act is to promote free speech and the free 
exchange of information, portions of the Bill must be changed. 
 The first area in which the Act is ineffective is in its definition of 
which companies are subject to liability.200 As discussed above, the Bill 
is over-inclusive in that it includes companies that do no business 
within the United States.201 At the same time, it is under-inclusive in 
that some U.S. companies that have already caused harm would not 
be affected.202 Yahoo!, because of its disclosure of the identity of Shi 
Tao, is arguably the worst offender of any company that has assisted 
Chinese censorship.203 Yahoo!, however, would not be held liable for 
its transgressions under the GOFA.204 Yahoo.cn, the entity that re-
vealed the information to Chinese government authorities, is a sub-
sidiary of Yahoo!, but the Chinese company Alibaba.com owns sixty 
percent of that subsidiary.205 Alibaba is not listed on a U.S. securities 
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exchange and, by virtue of this controlling interest, both it and Ya-
hoo! would escape liability.206 
 Another way the GOFA fails to achieve its goal of promoting global 
freedom of information is through its method of designating “Internet-
restricting” countries.207 As discussed above, companies would only be 
prohibited from assisting countries designated as Internet-restricting by 
the President.208 The initial list of countries already has glaring omis-
sions and it is likely that countries that censor will remain excluded 
from the list either for political reasons or because their censorship is 
simply not as egregious as that of other offenders.209 While the GOFA 
will have some effect on China and other countries that make the list, 
the citizens of restricting countries not included will have no recourse 
for any harm.210 
 In sum, the GOFA, while touted as a bill to promote and protect 
global Internet freedom, has several troubling provisions and does little 
to actually promote free world-wide information exchange.211 It seems 
designed to be more a form of punishment for U.S. companies that 
have already assisted Internet-censoring governments than a real at-
tempt to prevent censorship altogether.212 More work must be done 
and more thought put into this Bill.213 
C. What Can Be Done? 
 If the GOFA fails to accomplish its goal of preventing censorship, 
what can be done? In an open letter to the members of the Subcom-
mittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, 
at the beginning of that committee’s February hearings, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) laid out a number of topics for the commit-
tee to discuss with the Internet companies in attendance.214 When 
combined with several provisions of the Global Information Freedom 
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Act, these topics should serve as the foundation for an effective new 
U.S. response to the problem of Internet censorship.215 
1. Limit Data Collection and Data Retention 
 Information that could personally identify a particular user of 
Internet services is the most dangerous information Internet compa-
nies possess.216 In countries such as China, even the IP address of a 
computer accessing restricted information may be enough to identify 
the person operating that computer.217 To the extent possible, Inter-
net service providers should refrain from collecting and storing any 
such information that could personally identify individual users.218 
 In the search engine and content provider contexts, this could be 
as simple as storing IP address information in a way that completely 
dissociates the address information from the search conducted or 
content accessed.219 In e-mail and instant messaging situations, the 
goal should be to collect as little information as is necessary to pro-
vide the service and to retain that information for as little time as pos-
sible.220 If the information needed can easily identify a particular user, 
that information should be stored on servers outside of the restricting 
country.221 
2. Incident Collection and Reporting 
 Internet companies should collect and publish statistics on the 
amount of information they have been asked to block or remove from 
their servers and the reasons given for these requests.222 They should 
specifically note the particular law enforcement agency that requested 
the censorship and the law, if any, that was used to justify the action.223 
 If a search engine is required to censor search results or prevent 
access to sites, it should inform users that information has been ex-
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cluded from the results.224 It should provide the URL for the ex-
cluded information even if that URL is unreachable from within the 
restricting country.225 Information about such censorship requests 
should be collected, stored, and published.226 
 Collecting this data will provide valuable information for entities 
working to counteract the censorship activities of foreign countries 
and will provide the international community with evidence of the 
repressive nature of censorship regimes.227 While the GOFA advocates 
this kind of collection, it only does so with countries on the Internet-
restricting list and also requires collection of the specific content cen-
sored.228 A better approach is to protect the rights and identities of 
individual Internet users by collecting this data from all countries, but 
reporting only the types of information excluded and the reasons for 
exclusion.229 
3. Do not do Direct Business with Forces of State Oppression 
 The EFF next recommends that U.S. companies be prohibited 
from intentionally providing support and assistance to those who would 
restrict the free exchange of information on the Internet.230 This does 
not mean, as the GOFA suggests, that companies should be barred 
from selling any products that can be used for such purposes to foreign 
countries.231 Many of those products, such as Internet routers and fire-
wall software, have legitimate purposes in protecting networks from 
hackers and preventing the spread of Internet viruses.232 Preventing 
their use for legitimate purposes will only harm world-wide Internet 
users.233 
 With that said, there is still no need for U.S. companies to offer 
knowing assistance to foreign officials specifically requesting assistance 
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with Internet censorship.234 Companies should offer assistance for the 
legitimate uses of their products and no more.235 Granted, this will be a 
difficult line to draw, as legitimate purposes and censorship uses often 
overlap.236 Still, to the extent such a provision helps change the mind-
set of U.S. corporations, it will benefit the fight against Internet censor-
ship. 
4. Offer Opportunistic Encryption with Internet Services 
 The availability of opportunistic encryption is a crucial step in the 
promotion of free speech and free information exchange online.237 
Most online services transmit easily intercepted unencrypted plain-text 
data over the Internet.238 Encryption provides a relatively easy way to 
make the same information unreadable and should be added to pro-
tect the content of e-mail messages, instant messaging, and search re-
quests and results whenever possible.239 
 The potential problem with offering encryption lies in U.S. export 
controls that bar encryption exports to some foreign countries.240 How-
ever, China and Saudi Arabia are not included in the list of embargoed 
countries.241 The use of encryption would therefore aid the citizens of 
two of the strictest Internet censoring regimes, and serious considera-
tion should be given to modifying the export rules to allow at least ex-
port strength encryption to be exported to embargoed countries.242 
5. Support Technologies that Innovate Around Censorship and 
Surveillance 
 The final EFF suggestion is that governments and private compa-
nies should invest in and develop technologies to circumvent the cen-
sorship efforts of foreign governments.243 By creating the OGIF within 
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the IBB, the GIFA not only creates a government office with that re-
sponsibility, but also puts control of that office in the hands of the or-
ganization that has spent decades developing and operating anti-radio 
jamming technologies for Radio Free America, Radio Free Europe, 
and Radio Free Asia.244 Enacting this GIFA provision would provide 
substantial funding for cooperation with private companies in the de-
velopment and deployment of technologies that would extend this 
anti-jamming mission to the Internet.245 
6. Penalties 
 Although neither the EFF nor the GIFA recommend penalties for 
U.S. companies that assist in Internet censorship, such penalties will 
be an important aspect of any legislation seeking to curb U.S. compa-
nies’ involvement in Internet censorship.246 
 Unlike the broad-based penalties recommended by the GOFA that 
would affect foreign companies that are merely listed on U.S. securities 
exchanges, U.S. legislation should focus on penalizing only U.S. com-
panies and the foreign subsidiaries in which those companies own a 
controlling share.247 Both civil and criminal remedies should be avail-
able against any such company or individual that reveals any informa-
tion that could be used to identify users of their services.248 These pen-
alties would not only provide companies with a legitimate reason to 
refuse foreign demands for such information, but would also give this 
legislation the bite it needs to be an effective deterrent for U.S. com-
panies.249 
7. International Cooperation 
 Finally, the United States cannot solve the problem of Internet 
censorship by simply enacting domestic legislation.250 It may be able 
to curb some activities of U.S. companies, but many foreign compa-
nies, including those within Internet-restricting countries, are ready 
and able to step into any void left by lessened U.S. competition.251 
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 The United States must therefore work with the United Nations 
and foreign countries that share its desire to promote free expression 
to address the problem on a global scale and apply pressure to all na-
tions that restrict the free exchange of information.252 The GIFA al-
ready contains sections that call for a U.N. resolution and increased 
pressure from the international community.253 Both of these provi-
sions should be included in any U.S. legislation.254 
III. Conclusion 
 Global Internet censorship is a problem that affects all those who 
cherish freedom of expression and the free exchange of ideas. The 
United States and other countries that value these rights need to work 
together to provide the appropriate pressures and incentives to open 
the Internet for all to use without restriction. 
 At the same time, countries pushing for censorship reform need 
to maintain the moral high ground. It is somewhat hypocritical, for 
example, for the United States to propose legislation preventing 
companies from providing user information to foreign governments 
at the same time that it presses those same companies to provide it 
with information about the Internet searches of U.S. Internet users.255 
Likewise, it should not criticize other countries for monitoring e-mail 
and instant messaging communications while it takes measures to 
make that same information more easily accessible for officials in this 
country.256 The Internet should remain a conduit for free expression 
of all information, not that information approved by any one gov-
ernment. Only be achieved with global understanding and coopera-
tion can this goal be achieved. 
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